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After years of diplomatic, political and programmatic effort, Central America is finally considered mine-safe. Bear-
ing in mind the instability and strife that wracked 
the region during the 1980s and the extensive 
use of landmines by military and insurgent forc-
es, the elimination of the mine threat should be 
cause for celebration. However, to paraphrase 
Microsoft founder Bill Gates, success can be 
a poor teacher because it seduces smart peo-
ple into thinking that they cannot lose. Set-
ting aside the impulse for self-congratulation, 
the mine-action community ought to take a 
moment to ref lect on how this achievement 
might have been brought about with a more ef-
ficient use of the considerable assets required or 
on how the final outcome could have been real-
ized sooner. In reviewing the journey by which 
the Central American nations arrived at this 
milestone with the support of the OAS and the 
international donor community, there are some 
important lessons other mine-clearance pro-
grams can apply to ensure they achieve their 
clearance goals in the most effective way.
In the Beginning
Six years before the Ottawa Convention 
cemented a commitment to rid the world of 
anti-personnel landmines, the OAS had con-
ceived a vision to help the governments of 
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Since 1991, the Organization of American States has worked to eliminate the threat 
of anti-personnel landmines in the Americas. In 2010, the OAS Mine Action Program 
marked a major milestone toward that goal as Nicaragua completed its national de-
mining plan to establish a once war-torn Central America as a mine-safe region. Not-
withstanding the success of these efforts, it is important to understand what could 
have been done better to achieve mine-clearance goals more efficiently and effec-
tively and how these lessons might be applied to other programs. 
Central America emerge from a decade of con-
flict by clearing landmines from their nation-
al territories. In response to a 1991 request 
from the newly-installed democratic govern-
ment in Nicaragua, the OAS called upon the 
Inter-American Defense Board, a rarely-used 
military adjunct of the OAS, to study the mine 
problem in Central America and recommend a 
plan of action. Although the IADB’s assessment 
focused primarily on Nicaragua, which was the 
most severely mine-affected nation in the re-
gion, its staff also studied the landmine prob-
lem in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Honduras, all of which had seen the use of an-
ti-personnel mines to some extent throughout 
the 1980s and had requested similar assistance. 
The IADB initially developed assistance 
plans for each country, with the exception of 
Guatemala, where the government was con-
tinuing to battle insurgent groups. Plans were 
based on the national military forces’ mine- 
contamination information, which in most 
cases was incomplete, if not wholly inaccurate. 
Moreover, planning focused primarily on pro-
viding initial training and equipment to launch 
mine-clearance work without the intention of 
sustaining operations for an extended period 
of time. Without any significant operation-
al experience in mine-clearance programs, 
and with few recent examples of programs in 
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the world from which to draw im-
portant lessons, the IADB lacked 
a strong example on which to base 
clearance timelines. 
By 1997, the OAS effort to support 
mine clearance in Central America 
had begun to take on a more struc-
tured look. The General Assembly, 
the main political body of the OAS, 
endorsed the work initiated by the 
IADB and created a special fund to 
accept contributions from donor 
countries to support what became 
known as the Assistance Program 
for Demining in Central America. 
The concept of support used in this 
program evolved beyond only train-
ing and equipping deminers from 
national armed forces to providing 
teams of international military su-
pervisors. These teams allowed for 
quality assurance and certification 
of clearance work, while the OAS 
established a logistical and admin-
istrative structure to support op-
erations in each country, as well as 
to continue fundraising efforts. In 
June 1997, the OAS General Assem-
bly approved a resolution to “adopt 
as goals the global elimination of 
anti-personnel landmines and con-
version of the Western Hemisphere 
into an anti-personnel-land-mine-
free zone,” aiming to complete mine 
clearance in Central America by the 
year 2000.1
Defining the Problem
Despite having support from 
OAS political bodies and the Central 
American governments for an over-
all clearance goal, the magnitude of 
the task in Central America was nev-
er clearly established. The specific 
sizes and locations of mined areas as 
well as the mine densities in each of 
the affected countries varied widely. 
In Nicaragua, where the armed forc-
es were responsible for planting the 
vast majority of mines, reasonably ac-
curate records, including maps, were 
available. Although this information 
initially yielded a credible basis for 
clearance plans, military mine regis-
tries ultimately proved to be incom-
plete, as some installed minefields 
had never been recorded or their re-
cords had been lost.
In Costa Rica and Honduras, 
mines were believed to have been 
placed either by Nicaraguan insur-
gent forces operating from their 
territories or by the Nicaraguan 
military in areas where borders 
were poorly defined or unmarked. 
Most of the available information 
was based on national military or 
security force archives about con-
frontations between the Nicara-
guan government and irregular 
forces along its borders. Limited 
mine-risk-education campaigns in 
Honduran and Costa Rican terri-
tories bordering Nicaragua later led 
to some reports from local civil-
ians about possible mined areas, but 
this source of information was nev-
er exploited systematically, nor was 
much effort made to undertake ex-
tensive survey work in the suspected 
hazardous areas. 
Defining the extent of contami-
nation in Guatemala proved even 
more problematic because few 
mines were used during its 35-year 
conflict. The primary threat was the 
result of unexploded ordnance on 
former battlefields about which few, 
if any, records existed. Consequent-
ly, the approach to the problem in 
Guatemala emphasized risk-educa-
tion campaigns and the focused re-
sponse of a small clearance team to 
reports that campaign promoters 
received from people living in the 
affected areas.
In this context, planning as-
sumptions were based on what later 
proved to be highly inaccurate and 
often inflated estimates of the num-
ber of mines and areas to be cleared. 
Table 1 on the following page shows 
national estimates compared to the 
number of mines and UXO items 
officers from the inter-american Defense Board during a 1991 visit to nicaragua to 
assess the mine problem.
Photo courtesy of WilliaM a. McDonough
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actually cleared. Where no minefield records existed, es-
timates were more than 10 times higher than the actu-
al number of mines. Initial Nicaraguan estimates were 
lower than the final tally because records on several 
known minefields were not taken into account when the 
original clearance plan was developed and had to be in-
cluded in operational plans as the program advanced. 
In retrospect, the planning process for mine clear-
ance in Central America was significantly flawed by the 
lack of clarity concerning each country’s mine situa-
tion. However, planners at the time had few historical 
precedents and practically no doctrinal guidelines on 
how to develop mine assessments. Prior to the signing 
of the Ottawa Convention and the development of in-
ternational standards, there was no clear roadmap for 
mine-action programs to follow. In subsequent years, 
this issue would come into greater focus as the OAS 
program—as well as other national, international and 
nongovernmental organizations—gained more practi-
cal experience in mine clearance.
Developing and Implementing Clearance Plans
For the most part, planning decisions prior to 1998 
were based more on resource constraints than on specif-
ic timelines or clearance projections. Although the OAS 
General Assembly had aimed to complete mine clear-
ance in the region by the year 2000, this target was not 
based on a rigorous analysis of the situation or available 
capacity. By early 1998, Costa Rica had deployed 35 de-
miners, Honduras deployed 100 deminers and Nicara-
gua deployed or planned to deploy 
400 deminers, but no serious pro-
gramming had taken place to de-
termine how long clearance work 
would actually take. 
When Hurricane Mitch struck 
Central America in October 1998, 
the devastation it wrought and the 
uncertainty about its effect on mine 
contamination forced a more seri-
ous review of clearance plans, par-
ticularly in Nicaragua. Early in the 
review process it became clear that 
the goal of a mine-free Central 
America by 2000 was wholly un-
realistic. 
Post-Mitch planning, under-
taken jointly by the Nicaraguan 
Army, the OAS program and the 
IADB took several previously ne-
glected considerations into ac-
count. The overall number of mines and mined areas 
was revised as several large mined areas were added 
to the inventory of demining objectives. Increased in-
terest on the part of international donors in helping 
Country Initial Mine Estimate Final Mine/UXO Count
Costa Rica 5,000 – 6,000 446
Guatemala2 10,000 – 15,000 518
Honduras 15,000 – 20,000 2,405
Nicaragua 115,000 – 120,000 179,6233
table 1: Perception versus reality: mine estimates for central america
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
2,098
281
307
165
1st Half 2nd Half
Honduras Costa Rica
figure 1: Mines/uXo in honduras and costa rica.
figure courtesy of carl case/cisr
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the Central American countries recover from Hurri-
cane Mitch translated into additional funding resourc-
es for clearance. A revised National Demining Plan for 
Nicaragua took shape, with an expansion in manpower 
to approximately 650 deminers supported by both me-
chanical and canine assets. The restructured plan con-
templated the clearance of more than 135,000 mines in 
991 mined areas throughout the country with comple-
tion projected by the end of 2004. 
However, as Nicaraguan deminers began to concen-
trate efforts in Nueva Segovia and Jalapa departments, 
previously unrecorded mined areas were discovered in 
what proved to be the most contaminated areas along 
the Honduran border. Additional areas were identi-
fied primarily through community-liaison and risk-
education campaigns carried out by the OAS or as a 
result of Technical Surveys of known minefields that 
identified previously unrecorded areas in the same vi-
cinity. As clearance work began in remote zones with 
difficult access, the overall number of areas and the esti-
mated number of mines to be cleared grew and the pro-
jected completion date for all operations was postponed 
from one year to the next. By the time the National De-
mining Plan was finally completed in April 2010, it en-
compassed some 1,023 mined areas containing 179,623 
mines.
Whereas the dimensions of the problem in Nicara-
gua were considerably underestimated, the extent of 
contamination in Honduras and Costa Rica was great-
ly overestimated. In both countries, initial clearance 
plans were based on the most reliable information avail-
able. Figure 1 (see opposite page) illustrates that the first 
half of the period from the beginning of clearance op-
erations until their completion resulted in significantly 
higher numbers of mines cleared than during the sec-
ond half of the period. Even as clearance rates per de-
miner remained stable, the per-mine cost of operations 
sharply increased.
nicaraguan deminers working in steep terrain in nueva segovia department.
Photo courtesy of PaDca
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These developments took place 
from early 2001 through 2003, a 
period when International Mine 
Action Standards were in their ear-
ly stages of development and con-
cepts such as Non-technical Survey 
and Land Release were not widely 
established. Nonetheless, the same 
principles described in the recent-
ly published IMAS 08.204 and 08.215 
were applied in both Costa Rica and 
Honduras to clear numerous suspect-
ed hazardous areas and lend a meth-
odology to support these programs 
in meeting their clearance goals. By 
mid-2002, joint OAS-IADB-Costa 
Rican survey work along the Nica-
raguan border released the remain-
ing SHAs, enabling Costa Rican 
authorities to declare their program 
complete in October of that year. In 
Honduras, Non-technical Surveys 
were complemented by Technical 
Survey using mechanical clearance 
equipment in an area of Choluteca 
department that had been flooded 
during Hurricane Mitch. After six 
months of Technical Survey and the 
discovery of only one nonfunction-
al, metallic mine at a depth of 1.5 
meters (4.9 feet), Honduran author-
ities concluded that the remaining 
risk was tolerable enough to per-
mit them to conclude their clear-
ance effort.
Applying the Lessons Learned
There is no doubt that initial 
planning assumptions for clear-
ance programs throughout Central 
America were affected by poorly de-
veloped mine assessments and es-
timates. Even in Nicaragua, where 
minefield records were more reli-
able, the original clearance goals 
that envisioned completion in 2000 
and then 2004 were not realistic. On 
the other hand, overestimation of 
the magnitude of the problem in the 
other Central American countries, 
and a lack of methodical survey and 
assessment, never brought the ex-
tent of the problem into focus so that 
clearance goals could be defined. In 
hindsight, extensive survey work 
should have been accomplished at 
least as early as 1999 following Hur-
ricane Mitch, but it was not serious-
ly considered until mine-clearance 
rates dropped dramatically and the 
continuing high cost of demin-
ing large areas to find few mines 
forced adoption of an improvised 
land-release process.
The importance of these lessons 
is that they can be used in other pro-
grams where the lack of a clear pic-
ture on mine contamination can 
thwart planning efforts and dis-
courage donor support. The OAS 
program, while proud of its role in 
supporting the achievement of the 
long-standing goal of a mine-safe 
Central America, has recognized 
the need for defining the extent of 
each affected country’s mine prob-
lem. The OAS is taking the lessons 
learned from its prior experience and 
broadly applying them in Colombia, 
where reports of mines placed by il-
legal armed groups are widespread 
but offer little focus for clearance 
operations. Working with nation-
al authorities, the OAS program in 
Colombia has made Non-technical 
Survey, Land Release, and overall 
mine assessment and planning pri-
mary points of focus. Based on the 
valuable experience gained in Cen-
tral America, it is feasible to develop 
a coherent set of national priorities 
and plans that can reduce the time 
and the resources needed to address 
the problem in Colombia. 
See Endnotes, Page 80 
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